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Abstract: Within the context of sustainable development, both developed and developing 
countries are implementing policies that encourage economic growth, environmental 
protection and social well-being in resource decisions. According to the 2012 Rio+20 
Declaration, market-based instruments that complement regulations may offer an 
economically efficient push to sustainable growth. Market-based instruments such as 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) and other market incentives may play a crucial role in 
enhancing the livelihoods and wider well-being of poor people. However, economic tools 
such as PES can prove to be valuable in managing natural resource if the decision making 
and implementation process integrate adequate rights allocation and participatory 
mechanisms. Against this backdrop, this article examines the forest ecosystem services in the 
context of the mangrove reserve forest of the Sundarbans in Bangladesh. It is a UNESCO 
World Heritage site and one of the largest remaining areas of mangroves in the world with an 
exceptional level of biodiversity. This article argues for a more realistic and equitable 
approach to PES projects in Bangladesh. In conclusion, it underscores the need for effective 
participatory tools, third-party monitoring and multi-service PES schemes to improve 
multiple mangrove ecosystem services in the Sundarbans. 
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1. Introduction  
The Stockholm Declaration, adopted at the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the 
Human Environment, stated that: 
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Man‟s capability to transform his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring all peoples the benefits 
of development. … Wrongly or heedlessly applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to 
human beings and the human environment.
1
 
  
The intention to transform the surroundings was the key to promoting the concept of 
sustainable development (SD).
2
 The opportunities as well as challenges for the wise use of 
natural resources provide an essential impetus for both individuals and the community 
through a balanced approach between development and conservation.
3
 While inherently a 
dynamic, indefinite and contested concept, outcomes of SD are dependent on the pathways 
and operations of each country. The UN Conference on Sustainable Development 2012 
outcome document The Future We Want (Rio+20 Declaration),
4
 acknowledged the disparities 
in policy and institutional frameworks, political circumstances, levels of development, and 
economic and environmental interdependencies in the global community. For the future 
implementation of SD, the Rio+20 conference launched a process to develop a set of 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
5
 which are built upon the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Indeed, countries face different challenges and it will not be an easy task for 
the SDGs to reflect various national realities, capacities and development priorities.
6
 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that an integrated approach to SD would assist collaboration across 
various fields, sectors and scales by drawing connections between social, economic and 
environmental spheres, facilitating appropriate policy frameworks at the national level, and 
recognizing the need to engage local communities.
7
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The Rio+20 Declaration highlights that while SD remains the highest priority of the 
international and national development agenda, moving towards a green economy is expected 
to enable economic growth while increasing environmental quality and social inclusiveness.
8
 
Preference is given to market-based instruments such as taxes, permits or payment schemes 
(e.g., forest certification, payment for forest ecosystem services). Payment for ecosystem 
services (PES) is gaining recognition worldwide as a promising approach to achieve 
sustainable development as PES schemes offer economic incentives to individuals and 
communities for conservation of ecosystem services.
9
 However, many argue that the green 
economy as well as market-based instruments will advance corporate interests as they 
promote markets and businesses as a solution to environmental and economic problems.
10
 
Failure to ensure that environmental imperatives are factored into economic incentives can 
result in long-term constraints on future economic opportunities and will have a detrimental 
effect on social concerns such as poverty alleviation, and food and energy security.
11
  
  
Critics aside, the importance of the ecosystem approach and the relevance of ecosystem 
services
12
 in forest management are acknowledged in the Rio+20 Declaration. Forests are an 
example of an ecosystem that attracts internal claims as well as external actors with respect to 
its management, and highlights the competing parties that need forests for survival. They 
have a public good dimension because they produce transnational externalities as a result of 
their exploitation. They are an important source of wood for fuel and food and shelter for 
local communities – yet, they also serve as carbon sinks and biodiversity reserves for the 
world at large. Their management is subject to competing claims from environmentalists, the 
timber industry, and local communities that depend on forest products for their survival. SDG 
                                                          
8
 N. 4 above, para. 12. 
9
 For examples of PES schemes, Forest Trends & The Kattomba Group, Payments for Ecosystem Services - 
Getting Started: A Primer (UNEP, 2008), available at: 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf 
10
 Friends of the Earth International (FOE), „Reclaim the UN from Corporate Capture‟, available at: 
http://www.foei.org.  
11
 W.M. Adams, The Future of Sustainability: Re-thinking Environment and Development in the Twenty First 
Century (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2006), pp. 12-3. 
12
 Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These include provisioning services such 
as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water 
quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such 
as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and 
Human Well-Being: Synthesis (2005) p. v, available at: 
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf.   
 
 
 
 
15 emphasizes the social, economic and environmental benefits of forests to people
13
 and 
affirms „that the wide range of products and services that forests provide creates opportunities 
to address many of the most pressing sustainable development challenges‟ and that there is a 
need to integrate „sustainable forest management objectives and practices into the mainstream 
of economic policy and decision-making‟. 14 It noted: 
 
… the importance of ongoing initiatives such as reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.
15
 
 
The challenge is to find a balance between socio-economic development and ecosystem 
services. This article assesses the sustainability of payments for ecosystem services (PES) in 
managing the Sundarbans
16
 mangrove forest in Bangladesh. Globally, mangrove forests are 
one of the most threatened ecosystems and they are shrinking by 0.7% every year.
17
 The 
Sundarbans is the largest single tract mangrove forest in the world with a total area of 6017 
square kilometres (km
2
), in which 61% is covered by land and 39% by water.
18
 The 
mangroves of the Sundarbans, spanning between India and Bangladesh, are recognized as an 
internationally important site under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention).
19
 It is one of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites as it 
„supports an exceptional level of biodiversity in both the terrestrial and marine environments, 
including significant populations of globally endangered cat species, such as the Royal 
Bengal Tiger‟.20 A large amount of forest resources including fuel wood, palm leaves for 
roofs of local houses, reeds for making local mats, wood for paper, matchbox and hardboard 
is collected annually from the Sundarbans. It is also the largest national source of honey. 
More than 300,000 people directly, and more than one million people indirectly, depend on 
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the Sundarbans for their life and livelihoods. For them, the Sundarbans is a source of life and 
a safeguard from natural disasters. Along with providing fishing for the livelihoods of people, 
the Sundarbans provides essential ecosystem services. They protect the coastline from 
erosion, buffer communities and habitats against storms, produce timber, and work as a 
carbon sink to combat climate change.
21
 This mangrove forest is a reserve forest and plays a 
significant role in supporting a wide range of ecosystem services that sustain the livelihoods 
of local poor communities. In spite of a ban on logging and forest encroachment, there are 
growing concerns that illegal activities combined with storms and increased salinity are 
degrading the mangrove ecosystems.
22
  
 
It is thus vital that beneficiaries of mangrove services are integrally involved in mangrove 
management and restoration planning. In Bangladesh, market instruments such as the PES in 
forest management have been striving to integrate these competing local and global actors, 
claims, and concerns. PES schemes have the potential to provide benefits to local poor 
communities and governments, as well as financial incentives for better manage natural 
resources. These schemes can offer incentives to mangrove management and encourage 
sustainable development in sensitive mangrove areas. Payments can be made to mangrove 
managers for carbon sequestration, storm and flood protection, and aquaculture support. 
However, market instruments can provide a useful tool in the management of forest resources 
and in the provisions of ecosystem services only if they are integrated within institutional 
development and rights allocation.  
 
This article therefore explores the role of PES in relation to forest resources (section 2). It 
examines the allocation of forest rights (section 3) and participatory rights available to forest 
communities (section 4). The former argues that while states hold natural assets on behalf of 
their people for the benefit of present and future generations, these rights have to be 
effectively allocated among forest users. The latter requires the availability of necessary legal 
and institutional frameworks to protect victims from procedural weaknesses. Section 5 
explores the application of PES in Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forests 
Degradation (REDD) schemes. This article argues for a more realistic and equitable approach 
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to PES projects. As a market-based instrument, PES requires appropriate national laws, 
regulations and policies along with adequate economic settings and incentives (e.g., income 
generating opportunities such as sustainable prawn cultivation, marketing of mangrove 
products, ecotourism). However, it is feared that additional regulatory and compliance costs 
may hinder effective implementation of PES projects in the mangrove forest management and 
undermine the objective to balance competing interests. Section 6 (Prospects for Future 
Development) underscores the need for prior informed consent, third party monitoring and 
multi-service PES schemes to improve the multiple mangrove ecosystem services of the 
Sundarbans. 
 
2. Payment for Ecosystem Services in the Context of Forest Management 
PES, originally meant as voluntary cash transfers, include all financial and non-financial 
rewards or compensation mechanisms between the service provider and the service receiver 
for the provision of an environmental service.
23
 An important indicator of the growing 
ecological scarcity worldwide was provided by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 
2005, which found that over 60 % of the world‟s major ecosystem goods and services 
covered in the assessment were degraded or used unsustainably.
24
 A concrete way to move 
towards sustainable development is to guarantee the good functioning and delivery to society 
of all types of ecosystem services. However, PES considers that the actions of nature (e.g., 
forest, water or carbon cycles) are commodities and they are subject to the law of the market. 
Indeed, pricing of forest ecosystem services presents serious dangers as it may exclude poor 
people and not always reflect the damage caused to the environment. In addition, valuation of 
ecosystem services is particularly difficult, especially valuation that takes into account the 
social costs of introducing market-based mechanisms for services that were previously free.
25
 
Therefore, for PES to work effectively within the forest regime, several elements need to be 
integrated into national laws and policies. 
 
Firstly, the valuation of forest ecosystem services can include direct use value (drinking 
water, fish and hydropower) or indirect (river flows, flood control and water purification) use 
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value.
26
 For instance, to build a case for investment in mangrove ecosystem management, 
there is a need to assess the value of various ecosystem services, identify the major 
stakeholders, and undertake analysis of the socio-economic characteristics and interests of 
stakeholders, to help ensure that payment schemes are appropriate to their needs. There must 
be planning of sustainable financing, establishment of an enabling legal and institutional 
framework, and processes for building public awareness.
27
 In this context, the concern is that 
this valuation will create a greater divide between the developed and developing countries as 
PES promotes trade in pollution credits, monoculture and speculative markets (e.g., forests, 
water, biodiversity). In some cases, the apparent disrespect towards land rights and 
intergenerational equity (i.e., protecting resources for future generations) makes PES 
unappealing to those aiming environmental protection and social justice .
28
 Although UN 
agencies and international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank) offer full support for 
the valuation of natural capital for land-based communities and indigenous people, some 
label the process as a commodification of natural resources
29
 and the enclosure of natural 
areas (e.g., forest, watersheds, wetlands).
30
 
 
Secondly, there are concerns about how the payments will be made. Whatever payment 
scheme is available (e.g., private, public, permits, certification), the regulation and 
enforcement mechanisms, standards (e.g., certification standards), and effective monitoring 
of financial services have to exist to support any payment scheme.
31
 For instance, for 
mangrove ecosystem services, government agencies, people dependent upon forest resources 
(fish, timber, honey), small and medium size enterprises and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) need to be involved. Possible service providers include people collecting timber or 
honey, people involved in aquaculture, and local communities holding communal or common 
property rights. Third parties or intermediaries in the development of markets for mangrove 
ecosystem services may include NGOs or financial institutions.  
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Thirdly, it is important to ensure that property, access and use rights are well established. 
This relates to land tenure as well as rights for resource abstraction and use.
32
 The public 
sector can create incentives (e.g., performance incentives, tax exemptions) and disincentives 
(e.g., taxes, permits). There may also be grants and donations from individuals for 
development projects to support conservation, climate adaptation and poverty alleviation. 
Investment by the private sector for specific forest ecosystem services (e.g., carbon credits, 
water, biodiversity) may be available. It is also necessary to have legal rights for communities 
that manage the forest and other related critical ecosystems. These can cover access and use 
rights, control rights and transfer rights (public, private, communal or openly accessible). 
Property rights and user‟s rights vary significantly from country to country and communal 
management of forests occurs in many developing countries, including Bangladesh.
33
 If the 
state decides to retain property rights, the government will control all potential benefits. In 
this case, communities (or other stakeholders) will not have additional motivation to protect 
forests unless their benefits are secured and guaranteed by a clear legal mandate. Without 
security and certainty of landholding (through title rights, as well as other rights, interests and 
remedies), it is difficult to achieve the levels of permanence required to demonstrate 
ecosystem service benefits. 
 
Fourthly, PES is not a silver bullet and clearly will not work if governance is weak and 
unable to set favourable enabling conditions, transaction costs are very high, competing 
destructive resource usages are highly lucrative, or tenure or land use rights are insufficiently 
defined or enforced, as may be the case for some mangroves, coral reefs, flood plains and 
forests without clear ownership.
34
 However, under these circumstances, it is unlikely that 
governments will have alternative regulatory, procedural and remedial tools to effectively 
manage ecosystem services, as command-and-control regulations are also likely to fail. Many 
of the PES initiatives (e.g., carbon offsetting via reforestation) allow companies and 
governments to continue polluting the environment (e.g., through monoculture for biofuel, or 
plantation of invasive species) in exchange for the ecosystem service provided by forests and 
agricultural soils in developing countries, which act as carbon sinks. For instance, a large 
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number of the payment for watershed services
35
 are located in North America and China and 
funded by the private sector.
36
 PES such as carbon offsetting needs to focus on forest 
communities and PES approaches need to complement existing conservation tools. 
Regulatory and governance tools (e.g., land use rights for local and indigenous communities, 
transparency in the payment scheme, third party audits, adequate funding, access to 
information, prior informed consent, participation of local/indigenous communities in 
decision making) need to be strengthened to allow forest stewardship to flourish. 
 
3. Ecosystem Services and Forest Rights Allocation in Bangladesh 
The state of the Sundarbans mangrove reserve forest is difficult to assess as there are multiple 
drivers of changes in ecosystem services ranging from climate change and new agricultural 
methods to specific infrastructural developments (e.g., the Farakka barrage), and local policy- 
driven actions (e.g., commercial shrimp farming). According to a recent study,
37
 the 
management of ecosystems in the coastal zones of Bangladesh needs to capture the complex 
dynamics of social-ecological systems (e.g., sea level rise, new land uses, modified river 
flows, urbanization, new conservation measures). It highlighted that, in Bangladesh, while 
food and inland fish production is on the rise:  
 
[the] non-food ecosystem services such as water availability, water quality and land stability 
have deteriorated. Although the shrimp industry is contributing to GDP, this is almost certainly 
a factor in increasing soil and surface water salinity in this region.
38
  
 
Hossain et al. add that:  
  
[T]he calculations of the economic value of mangrove ecosystem services show that in the long 
run, the costs to the communities that rely on the mangroves, and society in general who benefit 
from mangroves carbon storing ability, often exceed the immediate economic gains. Yet despite 
their efforts the destruction continues as these values fail to make their way into the calculations 
that inform coastal development decision-making. This means that many existing policies still 
focus on short term gains which lead to mangrove destruction, such as providing tax breaks for 
shrimp aquaculture.
39
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As biodiversity becomes rarer and increasingly precious, protected areas – the ecosystems, 
species, genetic diversity and associated values that societies agree to conserve – are 
becoming an ever more important focus of interest and concern.
40
 The importance of 
protected areas is emphasized by international conventions, such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD),
41
 the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention),
42
 and the Ramsar 
Convention.
43
 Bangladesh has ratified these multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs).
44
 The significance of these areas is also confirmed by international programmes, for 
instance, the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme.
45
 The Sundarbans Reserve Forest 
is a protected area under the Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation Order (1973) with three 
wildlife sanctuaries managed by the World Heritage Convention since 1997 through the 
Forest Department (under the Ministry of Environment and Forests). Several values
46
 are 
attached to such protected area, such as the Sundarbans, ranging from supporting genetic and 
species diversity
47
 to providing – directly and indirectly – water, food, clothes, shelter, and 
medicines to human beings. By conserving habitats, protected areas can increase the 
ecosystems‟ resilience to climate change and reduce vulnerability of communities to natural 
disasters, and provide them with livelihood resources to withstand and recover from crises.
48
 
At the same time, the economic value (e.g., water, fisheries, timber) of such protected areas 
or reserve forests cannot be ignored as these areas can offer opportunities for ecotourism and 
provide jobs and livelihoods.
49
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PES has the potential for better forest ecosystem management but presents dangers and social 
costs unless carefully implemented and monitored inside an equitable and participatory 
system inclusive of different types of actors. Thus, a clear set of rights is useful for assigning 
responsibilities, duties, and obligations distributing benefits among different actors (e.g., 
forest users, government agencies) involved is crucial. Effective forest rights allocation 
would benefit communities, reduce social conflicts, and promote environmental protection 
and awareness.
50
 Initiating PES schemes without first protecting and allocating land 
ownership as well as access and use rights of forest-dependent communities will almost 
certainly lead to rent-seeking behaviour regarding forests. 
 
The majority of the poor live in rural areas in Bangladesh and depend on forest-related 
biological resources for survival.
51
 Actions to increase income generation from biodiversity 
can provide incentives for conservation but can also lead to degradation without the 
appropriate enabling environment, which involves establishing appropriate rights to 
resources, access to information and stakeholder involvement.
52
 Parts of the Sundarbans were 
declared a Wildlife Sanctuary in the 1970s to conserve animals and trees. A moratorium on 
felling of the dominant Sundari tree was enacted in 1989 and a 20 km buffer area around the 
forest was declared an „Ecologically Critical Area‟ in 2006. Finally, after the devastation 
caused by Hurricane Aila in 2007, a ban on all timber extraction was put in place. The three 
wildlife sanctuaries of the Sundarbans are managed by the Forest Department which allocates 
permits for nypa palm (golpata), honey and fish.
53
 However, illegal logging is high in the 
Sundarbans and the forest department, with little manpower, is unable to control or monitor 
illegal activities. The level of corruption is also high, which is cited as the main reason for the 
massive destruction of timber and non-timber related forest products.
 54
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Prior to the Sundarbans being declared as a reserve forest in 1977, a number of forestry 
conservation plans were adopted that prioritized the need for wildlife conservation as well as 
revenue collection from timber.
55
 The first National Forest Policy, in 1979, inadequately  
addressed issues such as sustainability, community participation and their livelihoods.
56
 The 
government claims sole ownership of the Reserve Forest and has the ultimate authority to 
manage the forest resource collection.
57
 There are no recognized local rights within the 
reserve forest, and the population surrounding the Sundarbans has not yet been able to 
participate in the strategies and activities aimed at conserving the forest and using its 
resources sustainably. The Constitution of Bangladesh is not much help either as it does not 
provide any explicit protection of forests and wildlife. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh has 
stated that the constitutional „right to life‟ 58  does include a right to a safe and healthy 
environment, thus offering an implied protection of forestry resources.  
Articles 31 and 32 of our Constitution protect right to life as a fundamental right. It 
encompasses within its ambit, the protection and preservation of environment, ecological 
balance free from pollution of air and water, sanitation without which life can hardly be 
enjoyed. Any act or omission contrary thereto will be violate of the said right to life.
 59
  
 
The forest-related laws of Bangladesh adopt a command and control approach, demonstrate a 
lack of coherent policies and institutions, and encourage socially and ecologically conflicting 
centralized management regimes. According to the Forest Act 1927 of Bangladesh:
60
 
 
28A. (1) On any land which is the property of the Government or over which the Government 
has proprietary rights, and on any other land assigned to the Government by voluntary written 
agreement of the owner for the purpose of afforestation, conservation or management through 
social forestry, the Government may establish a social forestry programme ... 
 
The Social Forestry Rules 2004 (Amendment 2010) recognizes this provision of the Forest 
Act and ensures local community participation in afforestation activities in Government-
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owned forest land.
61
 The Rules are formulated to ensure participation of local communities in 
planning and management of social forestry programmes. The National Biodiversity Strategy 
Action Plan for Bangladesh 2004 described co-management as „the sharing of authority, 
responsibility and benefits between government and local communities in the management of 
natural resources‟.62  
 
Policies supporting co-management approaches to natural resource management include the 
Bangladesh Forestry Department‟s Nishorgo Vision 2010, which focuses on co-management 
and community partnerships as strategies for strengthening the management of protected 
areas.
63
 This network, supported by the United States Agency for International Development 
USAID, calls for enhanced protected area management, including co-management, and urges 
the adoption of participatory mechanisms to promote biodiversity management, use, and 
benefit sharing with local communities and other partners. Other projects that focus on the 
Sundarbans include the United Nations Development Programme‟s UNDP Community-based 
Adaptation to Climate Change through Coastal Forestation project that aims to promote 
coastal areas works with tree plantations, fisheries and livestock rearing by expanding 
livelihood options for climate-vulnerable communities.
64
 Another example is the USAID 
funded Integrated Protected Area Co-management project (IPAC),
65
 managed by the Forest 
Department, which seeks to engage local stakeholders through a participatory co-
management process, empowering them with decision-making rights and positive incentives, 
thus promoting their interest in, and commitment to, the protection of biodiversity 
resources.
66
 IPAC developed Project Design Documents for forestry voluntary carbon market 
projects that include Collaborative REDD+ Improved forest management Sundarbans Project 
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(CRISP),
 67
 discussed in section 5 below. So far, social forestry has had limited success in 
Bangladesh.
68
  
 
For the effective implementation of the projects, clear guidance is needed on land use and 
ownership. While social forestry is crucial to mangrove forest management, the central 
management of forestry fails to stop encroachment and settlement of forest land. In the case 
of the Sundarbans, forest ownership lies with the government, but there is an extreme 
shortage of trained forest officials.
69
 The command-and-control approach in forest law does 
not encourage community participation and benefit sharing, nor does it promote alternative 
livelihoods for communities living at the edge of the forest to curb their dependency on the 
Sundarbans.
70
 For instance, according to some critics, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
funded Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation Project (SBCP)
71
 operated on the basis of a 
„design framework [that] failed to recognize the profound interdependence among the forest, 
its wildlife and its human inhabitants - the traditional resource users‟.72  
 
This project was fundamentally flawed, as its primary effect was to destroy this 
interdependence by creating artificial, alien and short-term resource and livelihood systems for 
the local communities and indigenous people in the name of „poverty reduction‟, and distance 
them from their ecosystem.
73
 
 
 
A recent incident in the Sundarbans highlights the ineffective nature of Bangladesh forest law 
and legal remedies. In December 2014, an oil tanker accident in the Sundarbans of 
Bangladesh led to the release of approximately 358,000 litres of heavy fuel oil into the river 
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and mangrove ecosystem.
74
 The response to the incident by the government Ministry was 
excruciatingly slow. At the request of the Ministry of Environment and Forests of 
Bangladesh, a Joint UN/Government of Bangladesh Sundarbans Oil Spill Response mission 
was formed under the coordination of the UNDP.
75
 The objective of the mission was to 
strengthen the Government‟s efforts in containing and cleaning up the oil spillage, as well as 
to provide support for assessing the situation and developing an action plan for a phased 
response and recovery. The lack of a formal oil spill contingency plan, weak response 
management and response infrastructure, along with a lack of effective monitoring, impeded 
response and recovery efforts. As of March 2015, only 68,200 litres of oil had been 
recovered
76
 - the rest continues to pollute the forest ecosystems (e.g., water, fisheries, 
wildlife) and affect human health and livelihoods. While some people benefitted 
economically from the oil recovery scheme, the UNEP/OCHA report emphasised the health 
and environmental risk and referred to the incident as a „serious wake up call‟ for 
Bangladesh.
77
 Shipping oil through the forest poses a serious threat to the forest and forest-
dependent communities, and there are insufficient appropriate safeguards and mitigation 
measures in place. Within two months of imposing a ban on the shipping route, the 
government lifted the ban on cargo boats, although oil tankers remain banned.
78
 
 
4. Stewardship and Participatory Democracy  
The government, as the land owner and steward, has a duty to the community to protect and 
preserve the mangrove forest.
79
 In this sense, the government is the trustee to conserve the 
forest land for the benefit of present and future generations. The government owes a duty to 
the people to provide access to information and enable them to participate in decision-making 
processes in relation to the mangrove forest. At the same time, NGOs and local communities 
are also involved in forest stewardship – i.e., managing and conserving the forest and related 
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resources. However, the hierarchical approach to mangrove forest management in 
Bangladesh, as exemplified in its reliance on command and control regulation, limits a more 
participatory mode of governance. Participatory democracy requires the availability of 
necessary frameworks to protect victims from procedural inequity and increased participation 
involving a set of actors (e.g., government authorities, users, local community, NGOs, 
industries).
80
 The participatory process needs to be fair, inclusive and open, and it is thought 
that public participation improves the outcomes of the process by enhancing their 
legitimacy.
81
  Public participation is an area which could potentially enhance public trust in 
government decision making, and thus reduce litigation.
82
 Public involvement in decision 
making and environmental information could help to achieve a better decision in the first 
place, and mitigate the need to resolve disputes in court in the long run. By integrating the 
people‟s voice in the decision-making process, supplying community groups with 
environmental information and opening access to the environmental assessment reports, the 
government not only can achieve high quality natural resource management, it can also 
contribute to reducing social and economic inequalities.
83
 
 
On the one hand,  the forest laws in Bangladesh  mention the problems of over consumption 
(for fuelwood or timber) and the unsustainable exploitation of resources (e.g., due to poverty, 
illegal logging, land grabbing).
84
 On the other hand,  participatory approaches are weakly 
incorporated into forest-related regulations (e.g., lack of free prior informed consent of the 
forest community). The Forest Policy 1994 and the Social Forestry Rules (2004) incorporate 
participatory forestry and allow cooperation between state and non-state actors. The Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper 2013
85
 and the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action 
Plan 2008
86
  both explicitly emphasize the importance of participatory forest resource 
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management. However, the forest regime of Bangladesh is centrally controlled by the Forest 
Department with little or no genuine involvement of the local people.
87
 Forest management is 
more focused on generating revenues from timber production and sidelines the contributions 
of the non-wood forest products to local livelihoods and forest sustainability.
88
  
 
The social forestry rules in the National Forest Policy 1994 promote benefit-sharing 
arrangements to alleviate poverty. The Policy states in para 1, „the Government shall work 
jointly with NGOs and ensure people‟s participation‟. It further states: „Denuded and 
encroached Government forest lands will be identified and brought under afforestation 
program with people‟s participation on benefit sharing approach…‟.89 While social forestry 
related projects have led to better quality of life of the participants,
90
 some of these projects 
are dogged with criticisms regarding a lack of local stakeholder consultation in planning and 
management of forest resources along with donor-driven agendas, weak local level 
institutions and a top-down policy approach.
91
 
  
Some sectoral laws in Bangladesh require the participation of people in decision making and 
include provisions on environmental impact assessment (EIA).
92
 However, participation is 
limited to the project initiation level. Consultation is often pro forma and does not promote an 
effective decision-making process. A study
93
 of the EIA of a proposed coal-based thermal 
power plant highlights the problems associated with consultation processes in Bangladesh. 
The proposed power plant is to be situated 14 kilometres downstream from the Sundarbans in 
Rampal upazila of Bagerhat beside the Poshur river and will generate 1320 megawatts (MW) 
of electricity. In 2012, the Bangladesh government signed a joint venture agreement with 
India‟s state-run electricity generation company, National Thermal Power Corporation 
                                                          
87
 A. K. Dev Roy & K. Alam, „Participatory Forest management for the Sustainable Management of the 
Sundarbans Mangrove Forest‟ (2012) 8(5) American Journal of Environmental Science, pp. 549-55, available 
at: https://eprints.usq.edu.au/6279/2/Roy_Alam_AJES_2012_PV.pdf . 
88
 ibid.  
89
 Paragraph 12. National Forest Policy 1994. 
90
  M. Jashimuddin & M. Inoue, „Community Forestry for Sustainable Forest Management: Experiences from 
Bangladesh and Policy Recommendations‟ (2012) 11 FORMATH, pp. 133-66. 
91
 Ibid. Also see: Dev Roy & Alam,  n. 87, above. 
92
  Razzaque (2009) n. 83 above, pp. 117-38. 
93
 Dr. A. H. Chowdhury, Environmental Impact of Coal based Power Plant of Rampal on the 
Sundarbans and Surrounding areas. According to this report, the proposed power plant will burn around 4.75 
million tonnes of coal annually when more or less 0.3million tonnes ashes and around 0.5 million tonnes sludge 
and liquid waste may be produced. Available at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/download/annex_2_eia_dr_abdullah_harun_et_et_pdf/annex2_eia_dr_abdullah_harun
_et_et.pdf . 
 
 
 
 
Limited, under the name of Bangladesh -India Friendship Power Company Limited.
94
 
According to the agreement, the NTPC is responsible for planning, building and operating the 
plant.
95
 Although the Department of Environment (Bangladesh) approved the project, it has 
imposed 59 conditions
96
 and the no-objection certificate is yet to be granted.
97
 . According to 
the critics of the project, the high level of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted from the power plant, 
and the contamination of groundwater by the huge volume of waste produced due to the 
burning of the coal (e.g., arsenic, mercury, cadmium, chromium) will destroy the mangrove 
forest and its ecosystem services.
98
 Another study of the EIA process of this coal-based 
power plant
99
 found that the process lacked adequate engagement and consultation with 
stakeholders. According to the report, most consultees did not have a clear idea about the 
extent of the project, the project location or project risks. There was a lack of transparency 
around issues of compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation. Moreover, no grievance 
mechanism was established to address and resolve the concerns of people harmed by the 
acquisition of land. A 2015 report by Transparency International Bangladesh
100
 highlights 
that powerful political party leaders and administration officials threatened to file cases and 
take legal actions against those who opposed the power plant. More recently, three French 
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Banks and two Norwegian Pension Funds refused to invest in the Rampal project citing 
environmental and social concerns.
 101
 Public protests against the project are ongoing.
102
 
 
At the forest project implementation level, people‟s concerns were rejected on several 
occasions. The ADB funded SBCP ignored the local people‟s perspective.103 This US$77.3 
million project aimed to establish a proper management system to protect the biological 
diversity and secure the environmental and biological integrity of the Sundarbans. The 
project was undertaken with the objective to improve the declining biodiversity conditions of 
the Sundarbans through poverty reduction, participatory management and development.
104
 
The project was intended to take place between 1999 and 2006, but the ADB suspended the 
project in 2003 citing problems with project design, the implementation of some activities, 
and financial management. In 2005, the ADB formally and unilaterally cancelled its 
commitment, blaming Bangladesh‟s Forest Department for failing to take steps to revise the 
project. This project also failed to adequately consult with local communities, did not adhere 
to the ADB and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) guidelines on consultation and 
transparency (e.g. local people had restricted access to project document), did not address 
how the proposed „participatory forest management‟ and „peoples‟ involvement‟ would be 
achieved within a national institutional and legal framework, did not incorporate the local 
communities‟ and indigenous peoples‟ traditional knowledge, and did not provide any 
grievance mechanisms to victims.
 105
 Corruption of the monitoring agency, i.e., the Forest 
Department of Bangladesh, was another reason for the ADB to terminate the project. 
According to critics, „the SBCP prevented local people from entering the jungle for their 
livelihoods, and allowed outside encroachers to smuggle forest resources more freely‟.106 
 
In sum, while the hierarchical approach may be effective in the event of an urgent or 
imminent threat (e.g., oil spill, forest fire), a participatory approach is superior when policy 
makers aim to attain multiple, and sometimes conflicting, sectoral goals. In addition, 
deliberative participatory processes will be more effective when implementation is dependent 
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on the cooperation of local actors. In Bangladesh, the law does not provide any guidance as to 
the determination of what constitutes a significant impact in particular situations or on the 
role of public participation. Participation and information requirements are limited. On many 
occasions, the government agencies simply sideline impact assessment requirements. More 
importantly, for political reasons, it is not always possible to access courts to challenge a 
resource decision of the government. Unfortunately, there is no provision for quasi-judicial 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts in these circumstances.  
 
5. REDD+, PES and the Forest: The North Proposes, the South Adapts  
REDD+ is defined as: 
 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries.
107
  
 
REDD+ activities may include PES.
108
 REDD+ payments made to forest users for 
reforestation to incentivize conservation or to tackle the drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation are examples of PES transactions.
109
 Government-financed PES programmes for 
forest management can be found in China, Costa Rica, and Mexico.
110
 The funding for 
REDD+ activities may come from national and international, public and private sources.
111
 
PES schemes may play a larger role in REDD+ activities if they contribute to the livelihood 
and well-being of local communities. However, a lack of clear policies, experience, and 
confidence in PES hinders its adoption in many developing countries.
112
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Within forest governance, REDD+ offers a „political and economic trade off‟ opportunity 
between developed and developing countries.
113
 Both the Stern Review and the 2007 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC Report  demonstrated that deforestation 
contributes approximately 18% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
114
 These estimates 
supported the decisions at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 and 15
115
 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
116
 to adopt measures for 
REDD+.
117
 „As an initiative “to” the South, “from” the North‟, both developed and 
developing countries actively participated during REDD negotiations to make it part of the 
solution to climate change whereby developed countries can offset their emissions and 
promote sustainable development in developing countries.
118
 While a large number of 
developing countries have readiness policies to reduce forest-based emissions, problems 
remain with REDD-related governance mechanisms which need to be transparent and 
inclusive.   
 
Can PES schemes help to implement REDD+ activities in Bangladesh? REDD is a 
developing theme in Bangladesh.
119
 After joining the UN-REDD Programme in 2010, the 
Government of Bangladesh established a national REDD+ Steering Committee and a REDD 
Cell. During 2011-12, the UN-REDD Programme supported these national bodies in the 
development of a National REDD+ Readiness Roadmap, including extensive national and 
sub-national consultations. The REDD+ Steering Committee of Bangladesh endorsed the 
Roadmap in December 2012.
120
 With Targeted Support funds, UN-REDD now supports the 
implementation of some elements of the Roadmap, namely, the development of a monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) Action Plan, capacity building for forest monitoring, an 
assessment of REDD+ corruption risks, and development of nationally-appropriate social 
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safeguards.
121
 Currently, UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations FAO are assisting the Government of Bangladesh to implement targeted support 
activities funded by the UN-REDD Programme on corruption risk assessment, social impact 
assessment and MRV.
122
 Projects such as the REDD+ARR Protected Area Project promotes 
carbon stock enhancement through Afforestation, Reforestation and Revegetation (ARR).
123
 
Another example is the project called „Collaborative REDD+ Improved Forest Management 
Sundarbans Project‟ (CRISP) developed by the Forest Department of Bangladesh.124 The 
main objectives of the project are to achieve carbon sequestration as well as livelihoods 
improvements through community participation in forestry activities, and the conservation of 
flora and fauna species through measures including habitat protection and improvement. The 
emissions reductions will be achieved by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. Here, 
REDD+ payments constitute a payment for ecosystem services by offsetting opportunity 
costs. These projects can play an important role in facilitating participation by the poor and 
marginalized in PES schemes.  
 
It is interesting to note that REDD+ schemes in Bangladesh are not only about climate 
financing mechanisms – they also aim to be foster sustainable forest management125  and halt 
the trends of deforestation and degradation as they are equally critical to protecting the 
livelihoods of millions of the country's extreme poor.
126
 In a country like Bangladesh, any 
performance-based payments would require supportive legal and policy frameworks, as well 
as effective MVR. In addition, the REDD+ programme must promote wide participation of 
local communities and provide adequate protection to other ecosystems and services beyond 
carbon sequestration. Some fear that the mangrove forest is being monetized into carbon 
credits. The „Sundarbans Forest Carbon Inventory-2009‟ conducted by the Forest Department 
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of Bangladesh with assistance from USAID and other international donors already 
determined the economic value of the mangroves.
127
 This economic valuation was criticized 
by local NGO platform as this approach promotes commodification of forests and has the 
potential to sideline the interests of indigenous and local forest communities.
128
 The REDD+ 
projects need to adopt a balanced approach and maximize synergies between poverty 
reduction, adaptation to climate change, and conservation of forest resources.  
 
To promote social and environmental benefits and reduce risks from REDD+, the UN-REDD 
programme has drafted Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria, which include 
several principles and criteria of relevance to biodiversity protection.
129
 Biodiversity 
safeguards developed outside the UNFCCC context
130
 seek to ensure that REDD+ does not 
adversely affect biodiversity. However, it remains uncertain how various international 
standards will be enforced at the national level.
131
  
 
In addition, the World Bank‟s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility plays an important role in 
financing REDD+ activities and requires participating countries to carry out a Strategic 
Environmental and Social Assessment. These assessments may, in turn, help prevent the 
negative impacts of REDD+ implementation.
132
 The Bank‟s own operational policies include 
further safeguards of relevance for biodiversity protection, such as World Bank operational 
policies 4.01 on environmental assessment and 4.36 on forests.
133
 Using these assessments 
could help identify and reduce adverse impacts at the planning stage. However, the problems 
associated with EIAs in Bangladesh (for example, the Rampal Thermal Power Plant project, 
discussed in section 4) highlight that the EIA process is often weak and the outcome can be 
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ignored by the decision makers. Moreover, Bangladesh already faces problems of high levels 
of corruption – examples can be found in relation to the Climate Change fund134 and the ADB 
funded Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation project.
135
 The fear also remains that the Forest 
Department with its centrally controlled power will introduce a new framework for forest 
bureaucracy over the Sundarbans which will allow the Department to manipulate forest-
related data and access funds. Indeed, monitoring and reporting of the biodiversity impacts of 
REDD+ activities would help clarify how REDD+ can best contribute to biodiversity 
conservation goals. However, monitoring in practice will require improved coordination 
between national-level actors responsible for REDD+ implementation and biodiversity 
protection. While safeguards provide an important means of ensuring that REDD+ does not 
undermine biodiversity objectives, „the pursuit of biodiversity goals may involve tradeoffs 
with other goals ascribed to REDD+, including maximising emission reductions and cost-
effectiveness‟.136 
 
6.  Prospects for Future Development  
The extent to which a sovereign country provides an opportunity to protect forest resources 
depends upon the values the country attributes to these resources in the face of external 
economic pressure, and the effectiveness of law and remedies.. It is clear that for a country 
like Bangladesh to preserve short-term economic gains, the long-term public benefit is often 
overlooked. Decision making in relation to sustainable forest management is driven by 
financial concerns and commercial interests, and rights to access fundamental public goods 
from nature are jeopardized by short-term economic interests. There is very little 
understanding why certain ecosystem services need to be prioritized over others and 
ecosystem-related concerns are not integrated within decision-making processes. Local 
communities are not efficiently involved in the decision-making process across the full range 
of ecosystem services. There is no independent monitoring or audit available, and the 
government agencies fail to play an effective oversight role to ensure actions that conform to 
agreed standards.  
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PES schemes in Bangladesh can manage and deliver ecosystem services at the local level if 
the focus is on rewarding and encouraging positive behaviour, and making the polluter pay 
for poor environmental practices. Yet, any monetary valuation will have to be transparent 
about the underlying assumptions and weaknesses, and realistic in its claims and ambitions. 
At the same time, any payment needs to capture the long-term commitment to environmental 
ends. There are several ways in which this payment can be made: small financial 
contributions by the government (e.g., payment under the social forestry programme), local 
business directly or indirectly gaining financially from the improved ecosystem services, or 
visitors contributing to PES schemes (e.g., eco-tourism). However, the risk remains that the 
„payment‟ will be lost due to corruption. It is also not clear what the „payment‟ will be used 
for. Faced with a multitude of commitments under international agreements and pressure 
from UN agencies and Northern donor agencies and financial institutions, Bangladesh seems 
increasingly ill-prepared to capitalize on the benefits from PES schemes. 
 
In Bangladesh, multi-stakeholder partnerships
137
 show some positive results. For instance, the 
Mangroves for the Future
138
 and Ecosystem for life
139
 projects are creating a platform for 
long-term partnerships for biodiversity management at the national and trasnboundary (India-
Bangladesh) level involving civil society, government, and the private sector. The 
Sundarbans Environmental and Livelihoods Security (SEALS) programme 2010-14, funded 
by the European Commission, aims to „contribute towards the maintenance and improvement 
of „ecosystem productivity‟ of the Sundarbans Reserve Forest (SRF) and induce 
„environmental and social integrity‟ in the habitats around the Sundarbans.140 One crucial aim 
of this programme is to develop alternative livelihoods for SRF dependent communities. 
Another aim is to equip the Forest Department to protect and manage the Sundarbans. While 
it is too early to assess the impact on local communities, this project is showing some 
success. For instance, the Sundarbans Development and Alternative Resources Integration 
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(SUNDARI) project 2012-2015 – funded by the SEALS Programme – works closely with the 
extreme poor households of the Sundarbans and offers training on non-timber SRF 
products.
141
 The German government-funded Sustainable Development and Biodiversity 
Conservation in coastal protection forests
142
 collaborates with a private shrimp-processing 
company on the greening of dikes. The company works with 3,500 small-scale farmers to 
produce certified organic shrimps that are sold in Germany and France. Communities are 
given training on the sustainable cultivation of the nypa palm as well as alternative livelihood 
strategies, such as honey collection. 
 
The challenges in Bangladesh are many. Firstly, multi-service PES schemes that value and 
seek to improve multiple ecosystem services within the mangrove forest have the potential to 
foster a synergy between the delivery of different ecosystem services. Such multi-service 
schemes may offer opportunities to combine multiple sources of funding from a range of 
beneficiaries. Partnership and co-management initiatives based on a modified form of social 
forestry may work in Bangladesh. However, such partnerships will need to be self-sustaining 
strategic partnerships involving a broad range of local organizations, businesses and local 
communities with the credibility to influence other local strategic decision makers. The 
challenge here is to capture the multiple values (e.g., eco-tourism, water quality, soil erosion) 
of the mangrove forest.  
 
Secondly, top-down forestry regulations may not, on their own, be the best option to protect 
forest ecosystem services because of a lack of effective legal remedies, cost implications, and 
uncertainty surrounding liability. Formal regulations can cause delay, cost, uncertainty in 
prosecutions and, in many instances, they may be ineffective as „individual retribution‟ or 
„general deterrence‟,143 without generating any improvement in standards or performance 
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levels. As a solution, some suggest the use of permits and licences, environmental 
assessments and self-regulation.
144
 Market-based approaches such as tax incentives and 
subsidies can complement „command and control‟ mechanisms. However, market-based 
approaches may be limited in scope and unable to cope with complex forest ecosystem-
related problems.
145
 In contrast, a „hands-off‟ approach that encourages voluntarism and self-
regulation
146
 (e.g., NGO standards) can cause a legitimacy deficiency.   
 
Thirdly, policy frameworks need to support institutions and facilities. Along with 
strengthening forest institutions (e.g., the Sundarbans Environmental And Livelihoods 
Security (SEALS) project), the donor agencies (e.g., USAID, the European Commission) and 
international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank, ADB) need to apply their own 
policies and guidance on, for instance, EIA and community resettlement. However, the way 
in which some of these foreign financial institutions conduct their activities in Bangladesh 
has been criticized on the basis of failure to assess risk associated to  project
147
 or funding in 
polluting project.
148
 
 
Fourthly, embracing the uncertain realm of REDD+ without ascertaining its impact on forest 
ecosystem services is extremely ill-advised. Greater clarity on the future interplay between 
PES and REDD+ is required. Also, along with adherence to biodiversity safeguards, different 
schemes and projects must ensure consistency and comparability of how emissions and 
offsets are measured, verified and reported. The emphasis on creating financial incentives 
may result in valuation conflicts between actors (state and non-state) engaged in forest issues 
at all levels. In addition, NGOs are not homogenous; there is a divide between NGOs that 
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embrace market-based approaches and conservation NGOs. Forest NGOs with greater 
funding often have greater roles in policy decisions and implementation. 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
 
As in the forestry management of many developing countries, market values and short term 
economic benefits are prioritized in the mangrove forest management in Bangladesh. 
Reflexive regulation, safeguards and monitoring for REDD+ in many mangrove forest 
countries are unachievable due to weak governance. This article highlighted the divergence 
between developed countries' enthusiasm for market-based regulation and safeguards, and 
developing countries' ability effectively to deliver such strategies. Moreover, the increasing 
involvement of non-state actors in forest governance, their accountability and the legitimacy 
can be questioned. In addition,  disappointments of the local people due to a lack of effective 
local engagements with relevant stakeholders underscore the need to have a credible 
monitoring of social outcomes and impacts.  Through enabling policy and institutions, PES 
can be an effective tool to achieve environmental as well as social benefits in the mangrove 
forest management. With the growth of REDD+ in Bangladesh, the cooperation among state 
and non state actors should not only be about prioritising different interests and clarifying 
legal obligations. Such cooperation should also accommodate community and environmental 
values of forest ecosystem services, initiate monitoring strategy to assess the impacts of PES 
projects, and promote effective participatory tools to empower forest dependent communities.    
 
 
 
 
